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IIAT the advantages of the fait accompli as a means for achieving a desired result are appreciated in this country as well as
abroad is apparent from an examination of the procedure for
Railroad Adjustments presented in Chapter XV added to the Bankruptcy
Act by the latest of the so-called Chandler Acts.'
While Chapter XV under its terms is to have a life span of only one
year,2inasmuch as the business depression is only one of several important
reasons for the present plight of the railroads 3 it may be assumed that
there will be strenuous activity on behalf of its extension. To the small
group of reorganization counsel who conceived its terms and successfully
fostered its enactment, 4 it is certain to be a success even though no plan
other than that of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad becomes operative
under its provisions. s
It will be a success in the eyes of its sponsors if for no other reason than
that the B. & 0. will not be in the process of reorganization and will be
* Attorney, Treasury Department.

Pub. L. 242, 76th Cong. ist Sess. (Approved by the President, July 28,

1939).

2 § 755: "The jurisdiction conferred upon any court by this chapter shall not be exercised
by such court after July 3, i94o, except in respect of any proceeding initiated by filing a
petition under section 71o hereof on or before July 31, i94o."
3 See 202 ICC 347, 351 (i934); Clay, What Shall We Do about the Railroads? c. II, p. 4
(Ransdell 1939).
4 See S. Hearings on H.R. 5407, 7 6th Cong. 1st Sess., at 92, 114 (1939).
s As of January i, i94o, four roads have submitted plans to the ICC for action under
Chapter XV: the B. & 0. R. Co., ICC Finance Docket No. 1215o; the Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
ICC Finance Docket No. 12283; the Montana, Wyoming & Southern R. Co., ICC Finance
Docket No. 12517; and the Chicago Memphis & Gulf R. Co., ICC Finance Docket No.
12663. The first two submitted their plans prior to the enactment of Chapter XV.
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insulated and protected therefrom for some few years to come, an example of what can be accomplished by utilizing the machinery provided.
With agitation for its extension in prospect, and because of the influence it may have on general reorganization machinery and legislation, it
becomes desirable to examine this new streamlined procedure for meeting
railroad corporate financial crises, to assimilate it with existing procedures
and to evaluate it in the light of desirable railroad and reorganization
policy.
PROCEDURE UNDER CHAPTER XV

Most recent corporate reorganization legislation6 has been designed to
provide stockholders, creditors, the court and any governmental agency
participating therein with full opportunity to examine the corporation involved and all proposals for its rehabilitation without pressure or influence
on behalf of any interested party or group of parties. Chapter XV, however, presents a reversal of that trend. Under its provisions, as will be
seen, there is only one plan and that plan is a virtual fait accompli before
being presented to the only two disinterested agencies having any jurisdiction over it, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the court.
The machinery is set in motion by the management of a railroad faced
with interest or principal maturities which it is unable to meet, in other
words, a railroad insolvent in the equity sense. To avoid an equity receivership or Section 77 proceedings the management devises a so-called
"plan of adjustment" 7 which by definition may propose "postponements
or modifications of debt, interest, rent, and maturities and modifications
of the securities or capital structures." 8 In spite of the scope of this language, it is quite apparent from the act that no plan affecting equity
securities is contemplated, for no machinery is provided under which
stockholder acceptance of a plan could be obtained. 9 For this reason as
well as for the practical reason discussed later that sufficient assents to
meet the percentage requirements of Chapter XV could probably not be
obtained to any plan modifying the position of stockholders, it seems
quite clear that no so-called "drastic" reorganization plan will be effected
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
The management's distress plan having been formulated, it is next
presented to all affected creditors in as persuasive terms as the proxy regu6 § 77 as amended (ii U.S.C.A. § 205 (1937)); § 77B as amended (ii U.S.C.A. § 207
(1937) ); and Chapter X (52 Stat. 883 (1938), i1 U.S.C.A. §§ 5o--676 (Supp. 1938) ) of the
Bankruptcy Act.

7 §710 (1).

§705 (7)-

9 § 706, relating to persons affected by the plan, refers only to "creditors." So too do

§§ 710 (i), (3), and 725 (2), which relate to acceptances of the plan.
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lations of the Securities and Exchange Commission will permit.'0 When
"creditors holding at least 25 per centum of the aggregate amount of all
claims affected by said plan of adjustment" have signified their acceptance
of the plan," it may be submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission for consideration under Section 2oa of the Interstate Commerce Act. 2
The Commission in acting on the application of the B. & 0. under Section
2oa held that it was not required "to approve the plan as such."'-3 Further,
Chairman Eastman in a letter to Senator Wheeler pointed out that the
commission was in doubt as to whether the language of Chapter XV as
passed by the House of Representatives required its approval of the basic
merits and fairness of the plan. X4 Presumably to clarify the commission's
functions in this respect, the act requires it to make certain specific findings.' 5 These include findings:
a) That the railroad is not in need of reorganization of the character provided for by
Section 77;z6
b) That the road's inability to meet its debts is reasonably expected to be temporary

only;'7
c) That the plan, after due consideration of the railroad's earnings prospects in the
light of its earnings experience and reasonably expected charges:
(i) is in the public interest and in the best interest of each class of creditors and
stockholders;
(ii) is feasible, financially advisable, and not likely to be followed by insolvency
or by need of reorganization;
(iii) does not provide for fixed charges in excess of what probable future earnings

will adequately cover;
(iv) leaves adequate means for such future financing as may be requisite;
(v) is consistent with adequate maintenance of the property; and
(vi) is consistent with the proper performance by the railroad of its functions as a

common carrier. 8

Whether these required findings indicate a Congressional intent that
the commission examine the fairness of the plan would appear to be an
xoSee SEC RegulationX-14, as amended February iS, ig4o, promulgated pursuant to the
authority conferred by § I4 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), i5

U.S.C.A. § 78n (a) (Supp. 1938).
xz § 710 (I).

"41 Stat. 494 (1920), 49 U.S.C.A. § 2oa (1929).
'3 B. & 0. R. Co. Financial Readjustment, 230 ICC 243, 266 (1938).
'4 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 4, at 186, 189.
1s By virtue of the second proviso of § 710 (2), however, the B. & 0. and Lehigh Valley
plans are not subject to this requirement. Whether the proviso is within the power conferred
upon Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 of the Constitution, to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States" is an interesting question. See In re Sink,
27 F. (2d) 361 (Va. 1928); In re Davis, 13 F. Supp. 221 (N.Y. 1936).
x6 § 710 (I) (a).

17

§ 710 (I) (b).

x8

§ 7i0 (I) (c).
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open question. While the commission is to find that the plan "is in the
public interest and in the best interest of each class of creditors and
stockholders,"' 9 the court, after duplicating all the commission findings,
must also be satisfied "that the plan is fair and equitable as an adjustment, affords due recognition to the rights of each class of creditors and
stockholders and fair consideration to each class thereof adversely affected, and will conform to the law of the land regarding the participation
of the various classes of creditors and stockholders ...... 20
Whether this difference was intentional or is merely a fortuitous result
of the inevitable trading and compromise in every Congressional conference will probably never be determined, but, as a result, the powers and
duties of the commission with respect to the fairness of the plan are as
uncertain as before.21
The proceedings before the commission present the first instance where
the fait accompli will play an important role. Chairman Eastman in his
aforementioned letter to Senator Wheeler also pointed out that the commission in the past has been and in the future is likely to be influenced in
its deliberations with respect to a plan by the fact that much time and
money have been spent on its preparation and that consents thereto have
been obtained from a substantial number of the interested parties.- As
first introduced, Chapter XV required no minimum or maximum number
of acceptances before submission to the commission,23 so that the degree
of pressure resulting from this factor was a matter solely within the control of the management of the railroad involved. The plan could have
been submitted before any solicitation of assents so that commission consideration would have been comparatively free from this influence or the
management could have waited until a large percentage of the parties
affected had been induced to accept it. 2 4 The original provisions referred
to have been changed in two ways. Submission to the commission must
now wait until holders of at least twenty-five per cent of the affected
" Ibid.
"° § 725 (3)21 That the sponsors of Chapter XV did not desire commission examination of the fairness
of the plan is apparent from the letter of Col. Anderson, counsel for the B. & 0., to Congressman Chandler in which he takes the position that the private interests as between the company and its creditors give rise to judicial questions that should not be considered by the commission. See H.R. Hearings on H.R. 3704 and H.R. 5704, 76th Cong. ist Sess., at 88 (1939).
-See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 4, at 186 et seq.
23 See H.R. 3704, 7 6th Cong. ist Sess., § 710.
24In this connection cf. § 77 (d) of the Bankruptcy Act, zi U.S.C.A. § 205 (d) (1937), providing for commission and court consideration of any 77 plan before submission to creditors;
§ 176 of ChapterX of the BankruptcyAct, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 576 (Supp. x938),
prohibiting solicitation of assents to a Chapter X plan until after its approval by the court.
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claims have indicated their acceptance of the plan, although there still is
no maximum on the number of acceptances which the management may
obtain before presenting the plan for commission consideration.25 The
other change is the inclusion of what appears to be a pious wish: "That
in making the foregoing specific findings the Commission shall scrutinize
the facts independently of the extent of acceptances of such plan and of
'' 6
any lack of opposition thereto. 2
While the commission is required to make the specific findings previously referred to, it apparently has no authority to modify the plan as
presented.27 This further limits the scope of commission action, for
either it must make the requisite findings with respect to the plan as
presented or refuse to issue its order and thereby nullify all the time, effort
and money spent on the preparation of the plan, as well as on the acceptances previously obtained.
More persuasive upon the commission than either of the foregoing will
be the fact that unless its approval is given to the plan as presented, the
railroad involved will probably be thrown into reorganization or receivership proceedings. While a drastic reorganization may be exactly what the
road in question requires, the economic consequences accompanying reorganization or receivership proceedings are so far-reaching that a government agency will be loath indeed to lay itself open to the charge that
it was responsible for their initiation. An examination of the commission's
opinion in the Baltimore and Ohio case reveals quite dearly how important
a part this reluctance played in their deliberations. After pointing out
that the B. & 0. plan merely deferred the road's obligations without reducing them and that this was an important weakness, the commission
nevertheless concluded:
The alternative [if commission approval were withheld] is dearly reorganization
under the bankruptcy statute. In such a proceeding, security holders undoubtedly
would be called on for much greater immediate sacrifices than this plan contemplates.
Approval of the applications by us will make the option available to the parties interested.2'
Under the circumstances the commission granted the necessary authorization.
The commission has also faced this dilemma under slightly different
2sAt the time the B. & 0. plan was presented to the commission, holders of over 30% of
affected claims had agreed to accept the plan. See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 21, at 49.
26 § 710.
27

See § 710 which refers merely to the issuance of an order authorizing the securities called

for by the plan.
29B. &. 0. R. Co. Financial Readjustment,

230

ICC

243,

266 (i938).
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circumstances but with the same result. For example, Section i5 of the
Emergency Transportation Act of 1933 prohibited the commission from
approving an RFC loan to a carrier (a condition precedent to such a
loan)29 "if it is of the opinion that such carrier is in need of financial reorganization in the public interest" with the proviso that the prohibition
does not apply to loans to receivers or trustees. 30 In addition, Section
5b (2) of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act contains a similar
prohibition on the extension of RFC railroad loans and requires a certification by the commission "that the railroad or railway is not in need of
financial reorganization in the public interest." 3'
Because many of the contemplated loans or extensions were desperately
needed by the applicant railroads to enable them to meet maturities and
thus avoid reorganization, the commission issued the certificates of approval required by the above sections in instances in which, judged from
many standards, the railroad did require reorganization and in fact found
it necessary to initiate reorganization proceedings within a few months of
the date of the certificate and the RFC loan.
The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company is a very striking
example of how far the commission has been willing to go in the past to
avoid any responsibility for the institution of reorganization proceedings.32 Between February 23, 1932 and September 29, 1934, the RFC
with commission authorization lent the Northwestern approximately
$43,ooo,ooo or at the rate of $i,4oo,ooo per month for the thirty-one
months. 3 3 Within a week of the last of these loans, 34 the road applied for
an additional $7,500,ooo and within a month the commission by division
four authorized a further loan of $4,138,000.35 Commissioner Mahaffie
who had dissented previously without an opinion36 was moved to express
his views on this occasion and said in part:
The applicant has failed to earn its fixed charges by $6,034,124.70, $11,216,820.37,
and $7,875,418.69, in the years 1931-33 respectively. In1934 its deficit in net income
29See § 5 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act as amended, I5 U.S.C.A. § 6o5
(1939).
30 48 Stat. 216 (1933), 49 U.S.C.A. § 265 (Supp. 1938).

3x 48 Stat. 1109 ('934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6o6g (Supp. 1938).
32 Other striking examples include the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co.,
202 ICC 597 (Dec. 17, 1934) which went into § 77 proceedings on June 29, 1935, and the Erie
R. Co., 221 ICC 427 (May 25, 1937) § 77 proceedings for which were initiated January 18,
1938. For a further statement on this subject see S. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 (74 th
Cong.), 75th Cong. Ist Sess., pt. 13 at 5921 (i939).
33See 202 ICC 347 (1934).
34202 ICC 267 (1934).
3S 202 ICC 347 (z934). The application was submitted October 6, 1934, and approved
October 17, 1934.
36

See 202 ICC 267 and 271 (934).
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will apparently not differ greatly from that of 3933. Even those figures do not appear
accurately to represent the situation in that had normal expenditures for maintenance
been made the deficits shown would be larger.... On the basis of present traffic and
earnings the money n.mw lent can hardly carry the property beyond May 1, 1935....
While I hope the majority proves correct, I am unable upon the facts before us to

join in the findings.37
Failure to authorize this loan which was used to meet unpaid vouchers,
current and past due taxes, and interest due December 1, 1934, would
inevitably have forced reorganization proceedings. So too would a refusal in April of 1935 to authorize the extension of the $3,8oo,ooo RFC
loan maturing April 13, 1935,31 yet the commission authorized both, with
a finding in each case that the road was not in need of reorganization in
the public interest. Less than three months later, however, on June 28,
the Northwestern's petition under Section 77 was filed at Chicago.
Faced with the alternative of complete approval or complete rejection39
the commission will almost certainly approve a voluntary plan accepted
by at least twenty-five per cent of the interested parties,40 particularly
when its duties and authority are uncertain and when to refuse to do so
will expose it to the charge of having precipitated reorganization of the
carrier involved. In other words, it seems unlikely that the Interstate
Commerce Commission will be in a position in Chapter XV proceedings
materially to affect the character, terms, fairness or wisdom of the management plan.
From the commission, the plan next goes to court. As a prerequisite to
filing the plan in the appropriate United States district court, 4' the
management must have obtained assents to the plan from creditors holding more than two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected claims including a majority of each affected class. 41 If it has not secured the required number of assents in response to its solicitations before and during
commission consideration of the plan, commission approval will provide
a persuasive additional argument for creditor acceptance.
Immediately following the filing of the petition, a special court of three
judges is to be convened in the manner provided by Section 266, as
amended, of the judicial Code. 43 The special court, after hearing, is
38 207 ICC 123 (1935).
ICC 347, 351 (1934) (italics added).
indicated earlier, the commission apparently has no authority to amend a plan but
must accept or reject it as presented. See § 710.
40 See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 21, at 49.
41 In the language of the statute: " .... the United States district court in whose territorial
jurisdiction such railroad corporation has had its principal executive or principal operating
office during the preceding six months or a greater period thereof .......
43 § 713.
42§ 71o (3).
37 202
39 As

210
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promptly to enter an order approving the petition as properly filed if
satisfied that it complies with the chapter and has been filed in good
faith, or dismissing the petition if not so satisfied.44
As introduced, Section 714 contained no reference to hearings in connection with the court's approval of the petition as properly filed.4s As a
result of a suggestion during the committee hearings,4 6 the words "after
hearing" were substituted for "upon convening" but no provisions with
respect to notice of such hearing were included and so far as the statutory
requirements are concerned the "hearing" may be purely ex parte. 47 This
hearing may, however, be of considerable importance, for the court's
jurisdiction depends, among other things, upon the requisite number of
assents having been obtained, including a majority of each class. The
determination of the validity of the segregation into classes, and of the
accuracy of these and other required allegations should be made under
circumstances affording full opportunity to all creditors desiring to be
48
heard thereon.
In line with the rapid tempo of the entire proceedings, the specia court
is required by the statute to "fix a date for a hearing to be held promptly
after the filing of the petition and notice of such hearing or hearings shall
be given to all persons in interest in such reasonable manner as the court
49
shall direct."
After the hearing, the court may either approve the plan as filed or
modify the plan and approve it as modified5s Whether it may reject the
plan and dismiss the proceedings is open to doubt. The authority, if it
exists at all, does so by implication only, for there is no such express authority conferred by the statute.5s
§ 714 .
4S See H.R. 3704, 76th Cong. Ist Sess., § 714 (1939).
46 See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 2i, at 52.
44

47 In the B. & 0. proceedings the hearing apparently was ex parte, for the petition was
filed on July 28, 1939, and the order approving the petition was entered July 31, 1939. The
29th and 3oth, incidentally, were a Saturday and Sunday. Apparently also no general notice of
a hearing on the approval of the petition was given. In re B. & 0. R. Co., 29 F. Supp. 6o8
(Md. 1939).
48 Cf. §§ 141-9 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 887 (1938), 1i U.S.C.A.
§§ 541--9 (Supp. 1938), providing for answer, notice and hearing in connection with the
approval of the petition.
49 § 720.
SO§ 721.
s5 Cf. § 77 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act, ii U.S.C.A. § 207 (e) (1937), and § 236 of ChapterX

of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 899 (1938), ix U.S.C.A. § 636 (Supp. z938). While § 727 of
Chapter XV provides for dismissal of the proceedings if no plan is confirmed by the court within one year, there is no provision for earlier dismissal and this section is further susceptible of
the limited interpretation that it relates only to confirmations delayed because of insufficient
acceptances.
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It is at this stage of the proceedings that the fait accompli is most effective, for the special court like the commission must make certain findings.
If it finds:
i. That at the time of filing the petition, the plan had been assented to by holders of

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

not less than two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected claims and by a majority of each dass;s2
That the plan as submitted or as modified by the court has been accepted in its
final form by holders of more than three-fourths of all affected claims and at least
three-fifths of each class;53
That the corporation and the plan meet the requirements which the commission
has already found that they do meet and in addition that the plan is fair and
equitable as an adjustment, affords due recognition to the rights of each class of
creditors and stockholders, gives fair consideration to each class thereof adversely
affected and will conform to the law of the land regarding the participation of
various classes of creditors and stockholders;S4
That all corporate action required to authorize the issuance or modification of
securities contemplated by the plan has been taken;ss
That the petitioner has not done any act or failed to perform any duty as a result
of which it would be barred from discharge as a bankrupt; 6 and
That, after hearings on the matter, all considerations paid or to be paid by or for
the petitioner in connection with the proceedings and the plan are reasonable or will
be determined by the court to be reasonable before paid;s7

the court is to file an opinion setting forth these findings and enter a
decree approving and confirming the plan which decree shall bind all
5
creditors of the petitioner whether or not they have approved the plan.5
The only exception to the binding effect of the plan is with respect to
59
owners of equipment leased or conditionally sold to the railroad. This
decree binding all parties to the so-called "voluntary" or management
plan is, of course, the goal of the entire proceedings.
In connection with the findings required by clause (3) above, relating
to the plan and the corporation, the act assumes the same attitude of
piety adopted in connection with the commission's similar findings and
provides:
That in making the findings required by this clause (3), the court shall scrutinize
the facts independently of the extent of acceptances of such plan, and of any lack of
opposition thereto, and of the fact that the Commission, under section 2oa of the
Interstate Commerce Act, has authorized the issuance or modification of securities as
proposed by such plan, and of the fact that the Commission has made such or similar
findings ..... 6o
s § 725 (1).

5 § 725 (4).

£8§ 725.

§ 725

56 § 725 (5).

s9 Ibid.

53

(2).

54 § 725 (3).

S7

§ 725 (6).

6o § 725 (3).
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This provision like the earlier one relating to the commission findings6'
is a result of the deliberations of Senate and House conferees and was not
in the act as it originally passed either house. It discloses most strikingly
the conferees' perception of some of the basic procedural deficiencies.
A brief glance at the court's position will lead almost inevitably to the
conclusion that it is likely to have no more effect upon the management
plan than has the commission. The court has before it a plan accepted
by holders of more than seventy-five per cent of the interested claims and
by at least sixty per cent of each class. 62 In addition this plan has been
approved with findings, though with disclaimers also perhaps, by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, an agency with a large staff of railroad
experts. Finally, and this is of great practical significance, much time and
considerable money has been spent to bring the plan to the final stage of
the procedure a3 The fait accompli is complete.
With respect to this plan the court apparently has two alternatives:
(i) to approve it as submitted or (2) to determine after necessarily difficult
analyses what changes, if any, are desirable and to amend the plan in line
with these determinations. The latter, in addition to the complicated
study necessary to reach the determination will, if any material change
is made, involve a repetition of virtually all the work already done and
will require resolicitation of all affected creditors and resubmission to the
commission. This will probably nearly double the cost to the railroad.
That these considerations do, as they inevitably must, weigh heavily in
a court's consideration of a plan is apparent from an examination of judge
Chesnut's opinion in the B. & 0. proceedings. Objection was raised in the
proceedings by a security holder who is also a railroad economist, that
the plan did not satisfy the provision of the Chandler Act requiring that
"it is not likely to be followed by the insolvency of said corporation, or by
need of financial reorganization or adjustment"6 4because it made no provision for 1944 principal maturities totaling approximately $123,000,000.
After a general discussion of the objection, in the course of which it agreed
that meeting these maturities from excess earnings was most improbable
61 § 710.

62Cf. § 77 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act, ii U.S.C.A. § 207 (e) (i937), § 174 of Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 574 (Supp. 1938), both of which
provide for court approval of the plan before presentation to and acceptance by security
holders.
6
3Up to July i, 1939, the B. & 0. had incurred about $6ooooo of expenses in connection
with its plan. Inasmuch as substantial fees and expenses have been incurred since that date,
it is not unreasonable to assume that the aggregate cost will exceed $i,oooooo. See In re
B. & 0. R. Co., 29 F. Supp. 6o8 (Md. 1939).
64 § 75o (2) (c) (ii). See also § 725 (3).
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but finally concluded that refunding at that time might be possible, the
court said:
In any event, as pointed out by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the inevitable alternative is reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act which, as has been
pointed out, is highly undesirable in the interests of all classes of security holders. It is
suggested that the plan might be modified, but modification in this respect would require re-submission to stockholders at very great additional expense and with uncertainty as to result. The suggested modification does not seem to us sufficiently definite
6s
and practicable to justify this expense and possible jeopardy of the plan.
Without delving too deeply into the substance of the B. & 0. plan, the
objection in question is a basic one. That the B. & 0. with no substantial
unpledged or unmortgaged assets will be able to meet these maturities, to
say nothing of the maturity in 1948 of $157,000,000 principal amount of
first mortgage bonds, is open to very serious question. Yet the plan was
approved as submitted by a court composed of three of the ablest members of the federal judiciary, Circuit Judge Parker and District Judges
Chesnut and Dobie.
While the B. & 0. plan is the only one which has so far proceeded to
completion, in view of the character of the procedure set up by Chapter
XV the result will apparently be the same with respect to other plans."
In addition to the specific provisions heretofore discussed which lead to
that conclusion, the general tone of the entire statute leaves an indelible
impression that its authors contemplated a speedy passage for the plan
through commission and court with no alterations by either.
Without in the least disparaging either the commission or any threejudge court which might be selected, it seems highly unlikely that any
Chapter XV plan involving a substantial number of creditors will be
amended materially or rejected by either of them. The commission apparently has not the authority to amend and is not likely, as the previous
discussion has indicated, to reject any plan presented to it. The court, on
the other hand, has at best a doubtful authority to reject the plan, and for
what appear to be overwhelming reasons is not likely either to attempt to
reject it or to amend it materially."a
6s In re B. & 0. R. Co., 29 F. Supp. 6o8 (Md. i939).
66The Securities and Exchange Commission in its report to the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce (Hearings, op. cit. supra note 4, at 61) concludes: "In substance, the
effect of the bill appears to be to limit the courts to approving and confirming so-called 'voluntary' or management plans."
6A Subsequently to the preparation of this material, the commission, on December 4, 1939,
handed down its first opinion on a Chapter XV plan since the enactment of the Chapter, the
plan being that of the Montana, Wyoming & Southern Railroad Co., op. cit. supra note 5.
As anticipated herein, the plan was approved in the form presented although Commissioners
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THE PLAN

In the foregoing discussion emphasis has been placed primarily on the
procedure through which the plan will pass and very little has been said
about the probable character of the typical Chapter XV plan. This is an
equally important consideration, for unless these plans are likely to require amendment, the procedural weaknesses of the act are of little consequence.
While, of course, the capital structure of each road will govern the details of each plan, certain general characteristics may be pointed out
which will be present in most Chapter XV plans.
First, it is most unlikely that any Chapter XV plan will affect stock
interests. This is true for several reasons. As pointed out earlier, the
statute makes no provision for effecting a plan involving stockholders.7
Further, it is apparently contemplated that the plan will always be promulgated by the management, 8 and it will be in the best interests of the
stockholders whom the management represents that no plan adversely
affecting stock interests be presented. In addition, because stockholders
have no present claim for anything which can be deferred or compromised, it will be difficult to present a plan touching stock interests unless
it not only affects them adversely but does so without any present inducement for their agreement to the adverse treatment. Any such plan, of
69
course, would probably never receive the requisite number of assents.
Mahaffie and Eastman dissented. A revealing segment of the majority opinion reads:
" .... The alternative to putting into effect the proposed plan is either receivership or bankruptcy. The plan of adjustment has been accepted by the holders of more than three-fourths
of the aggregate amount of bonds affected by the plan, this being the only class of securities

involved. We have scrutinized the facts relative to this application independently of the extent
of the acceptance of such plan by the bondholders, and of the lack of any opposition thereto,
and conclude that on the record here before us the authorization sought should be granted."
This was followed by the findings required of the commission under Chapter XV. The dissenting commissioners, on the other hand, stated that the record did not justify a finding that the
applicant's inability to meet its debts may reasonably be expected to be temporary only, or
one that the plan is in the best interest of each class of creditors and stockholders. Supporting
their first conclusion, they pointed out that the plan itself provides that the two per cent of
the interest contingent on earnings is not to be cumulative. A clear implication from this is
that the company does not expect to earn in the future the full five per cent which the bonds
now carry. In support of their second conclusion, they cite the Los Angeles Lumber Co. case
discussed later herein and conclude that the plan does not meet the standards of a "fair and
equitable" plan asserted in that casc.
67 See §§ 706, 710 (i), (3), and 725 (2).
68See §§ 710, 725 (6). As apractical matterno one but the management will be in aposition
to undertake the expense of the preparation and presentation of a plan.
69 This was the element to which judge Chesnut referred in overruling the objection to the
B. & 0. plan previously referred to, on the ground that acceptance of the objection would
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For these statutory and practical reasons, the plan will almost certainly
be one in which stock interests are unaffected. In the four plans now in
various stages of Chapter XV proceedings neither the interests of stockholders nor those of unsecured creditors are directly modified in any way.
Second, since the whole purpose of the plan is to avoid receivership or
Section 77 proceedings, it will be necessary to provide for a substantial
immediate reduction in fixed charges and for a postponement of impending principal maturities. In order to obtain the necessary acceptance of
the plan, however, these reductions and postponements must either be
temporary only or be balanced by some present inducement as, for example, a present cash payment. This means that Chapter XV plans are
likely to follow one of two patterns. Either they will provide for complete or partial deferments with no substantial over-all or permanent reduction in principal and interest, or they will offer some present inducement for the reductions proposed.
The B. & 0. plan illustrates the first type. It contains provision for
both partial and complete deferments. Portions of interest on some issues
will be fixed charges and paid currently while the unpaid portions of the
interest made contingent will not be wiped out but merely deferred. In
addition, some principal maturities are completely deferred. In presenting this plan to security holders it was strongly urged that, with one
exception, it would not reduce their total claims and that therefore they
would lose nothing by it in the long run. Added to this was the threat
that if the plan were not accepted, the road would go into Section 77 proceedings, and "that such proceedings would be long and expensive, with
resulting confusion and losses to security holders, and might result in a
'' °
total suspension of all interest payments for an indefinite period. 7
Other plans involving mainly principal and interest deferments are
those of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.7x and the Chicago, Memphis &
Gulf Railroad Co., a leased line of the Illinois Central Railroad Co. 72
require submission of the modified plan to stockholders which would involve "uncertainty as
to result" and "possible jeopardy of the plan." See In re B. & 0. R. Co., 29 F. Supp. 6o8

(Md. 1939).
70Plan of the B. & 0. R. Co., dated August i5, 1938, ICC FinancefDocketNo. 1215o. The
material sent to security holders is also reproduced in Hearings, op. cit. supra note 4, at 117
et seq.
71 Dated August 25, 1938, ICC Finance Docket No. 12283. See also Moody's Manual of
Investments, Railroad Securities 672 (1939).
72ICC Finance Docket No. 12663. The plan provides for extension of all the $735,ooo of
first mortgage bonds of the road until December 31, 1962, which is the date the lease to the
Illinois Central expires, and for the reduction of the interest on the bonds from 5% to 3%. This
plan is particularly interesting because it provides for a permanent reduction in interest with-
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The other and more attractive possibility which will be available to a
limited number of roads only, however, is that of affecting a permanent
reduction of either principal or interest or both by offering a present cash
inducement. Such a plan has been promulgated by the Montana, Wyoming & Southern Railroad Co.7 3 It proposes to meet the 1939 maturity of
its only bond issue by paying bondholders $15o in cash per $i,ooo bond
and extending the balance of $850 to 1949 with interest reduced from five
per cent fixed to three per cent fixed and two per cent contingent. This
will meet the principal maturity crisis and will reduce the fixed interest
on the $457,000 of bonds now outstanding from $22,850 to $11,653 or
almost half, as well as reducing the principal amount of bonds outstanding
to $388,450.
A somewhat similar plan for the Boston and Maine Railroad Co. formulated with the assistance of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was
disclosed on November 9, 1939.74 Under it holders of the outstanding
$1o3,833,000 of bonds bearing interest at from three per cent to five per
cent and maturing at intervals from February 2, 1940 to September i,
1967, all of which are issued under the Boston and Maine's sole mortgage
will be asked to accept in exchange for their bonds new thirty-year four
per cent income bonds for fifty per cent of their holdings and for the fifty
per cent balance either cash or new twenty-year four per cent first mortgage bonds. Cash in an amount not to exceed $26,o00,00o will be furnished by the RFC which will take up to $40,750,000 of twenty-year first
mortgage bonds as security for $14,750,000 of presently outstanding RFC
loans plus such portion of the $26,o0o,oo0 as is required. This plan, too,
will both solve the problem of impending principal maturities and reduce
interest charges, in this case, fixed interest, by almost $3,000,000 per year

and total fixed and contingent interest by almost

$1,000,000.75

That the second type of plan, i.e., one involving a substantial and
permanent reduction of either principal or interest or both, is limited to a
comparatively small number of roads is apparent. Both of the roads
out offering any present benefit. Apparently its sponsors believe that the present level of
interest rates generally and the undesirability of foreclosure proceedings will be sufficient
inducement to bring in the required assents.
73ICC Finance Docket No. 12517.
74 See Moody's Railroad Service 1295 (939).
7sWhile no specific mention of Chapter XV has been made in connection with the Boston
& Maine plan, unless the creditors accept it unanimously or § 77 proceedings are initiated, the
only way such plan can be made binding on all holders of the affected bonds is Chapter XV.
Unless all holders are bound to the plan it will be necessary to purchase the bonds of "holdouts" at a price far in excess of present market prices or continue to have outstanding small
portions of a variety of issues bearing varying rates of interests and with varying maturities.
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presently sponsoring such plans have single mortgages. 76 In this respect
the Boston & Maine is unique among Class I railroads. In addition both
roads either have cash or are in a position to obtain cash to be offered as
a present inducement for accepting the reductions. The absence of either
of the aforementioned factors greatly complicates devising a Chapter XV
plan providing for substantial interest or principal reductions.
Another element of prime importance in considering the probable character of Chapter XV plans is what is familiarly known as the doctrine of
the Boyd case. 77 Briefly stated that doctrine is "that stockholders cannot
obtain through the medium of a reorganization anything of value except
in subordination to the rights of creditors."78 Whether the absolute
priority rule of the Boyd case or a standard based on so-called composition
principles governed the character of plans under Sections 77, 77B and,
more recently, Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act has heretofore been an
79
unsettled question.
In the present term of the Supreme Court, however, that question has
been determined. The Court, by Mr. Justice Douglas, has held that a
plan of reorganization of a debtor dearly insolvent in both the equity and
bankruptcy senses and with assets admittedly worth less than twenty-five
per cent of the claims of bondholders is not "fair and equitable" within the
language of Section 77B (f) of the Bankruptcy Act ° if the plan allocates
an interest in the securities of the reorganized corporation to stockholders
of the insolvent one. 8 That holders of 92.81 per cent of the face amount
of the bonds had assented to the plan as well as holders of 99.75 per cent
of the Class A stock, and ninety per cent of the Class B stock was held
to be immaterial for, in the language of the Court, "the fact that the vast
majority of the security holders have approved the plan is not the test of
whether the plan is a fair and equitable one."' 8
While the corporation involved in the Los Angeles case was admittedly
insolvent in both the equity and the bankruptcy sense, the Court in
76 See Moody's Manual of Investments, Railroads Securities 61, 5r5 (1939).
77Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). The Boyd case merely reaffirmed
principles enunciated in both Chicago R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (i868) and
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago R. Co., 174 U.S. 674 (1899).

78McCutcheon, An Examination of Devices Employed to Obviate the Embarrassments to
Reorganizations Created by the Boyd Case, 8 Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing
Reorganization and Regulation 35 (1931).
79See Levi, Corporate Reorganization and a Ministry of Justice, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 3 (1938)
L. Rev. 769 (1938).
and Spaeth & Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 77, 32 Ill.
8011 U.S.C.A. § 207 (f) (i937).
8x Case et al. v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 6o S. Ct. 1 (1939).
S Ibid., at 7.
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adopting the sweeping language of the earlier full or absolute priority
cases8l made it quite clear that the rule was applicable regardless of the
precise financial condition of the corporation involved.
Inasmuch as Section 77 (e),8 4 Section 22I of Chapter X, 8s and Section
366 of Chapter XI, 86 of the Bankruptcy Act all apply the same standard of

"fair and equitable," the decision means that reorganization plans under
these sections henceforth must recognize that "to the extent of their debts
creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders against all the property
of an insolvent corporation ' 87 and must accord "the creditor his full right
of priority against the corporate assets."88 Section 472 of Chapter XII89
and Section 656 of Chapter XIII, 90 which also apply the "fair and equitable" standard, are, by analogy, also subject to the doctrine of the decision.
The effect of the Boyd and Los Angeles cases on Chapter XV plans
presents an interesting question. In this connection it is first to be noted
that while the other statutes referred to employ the words "fair and
equitable,"' 9 Chapter XV requires that the plan be "fair and equitable as
an adjustment. ' ' 92 Any implication that Congress intended by the altered
language to make the doctrine of the priority cases inapplicable, however,
would appear to be negatived by the subsequent provision that the plan
is to be approved only if it "affords due recognition to the rights of each
class of creditors and stockholders and fair consideration to each class
thereof adversely affected, and will conform to the law of the land regarding the participation of the various classes of creditors and stockholders." 93 In addition, both Senate and House Committee reports on the
bi194 specifically state that the principles of the Boyd case apply and the
Senate report in explaining why the words "as an adjustment" were
83See Chicago R.I. & Pac. R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (x868); Louisville Trust Co. v.
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago R. Co., 174 U.S. 674 (i8tg); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd,
228 U.S. 482 (1913); Kansas City Terminal R. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445
(1926).
84 i1 U.S.C.A. § 205
8S 52

(e) (1937).
Stat. 885 (1938), I1 U.S.C.A. §

521

(Supp. 1938).

Stat. 9ii (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 766 (Supp. 1938').
Kansas City Terminal R. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co.,

8652
87

271

U.S. 445, 455 (1926).

88Ibid., at 456.
Stat. 923 (i938), zi U.S.C.A. § 872 (Supp. 1938).
90 52 Stat. 935 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1056 (Supp. 1938).
89 52

93 Ibid.
91Notes 84-6, 89, and go supra.
9§ 725 (3).
94 S. Rep. 489, 76th Cong. ist Sess., at 7 (X939), and H.R. Rep. 358, 76th Cong. ist Sess.,

at 3 (i939).
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added expressly negatives any implication that they were added to make
the Boyd case inapplicable.9s
Assuming, then, that the principles of the Boyd and Los Angeles cases
are applicable, what constitutes a "fair" Chapter XV plan within those
principles? It would seem quite clear that a plan which reduced interest
or principal claims of secured creditors without any present compensation
therefor and did not touch the interests of unsecured creditors or stockholders would not be a fair plan. This was the conclusion of the legislative committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission expressed in the
letter from its Chairman, Commissioner Eastman, to Congressman
96
Sumners.
A closer question arises in connection with the deferment plans.
Whether extending principal maturities of secured creditors and making
the payment of their interest contingent on earnings, while not altering
the rights of unsecured creditors or stockholders, is according to secured
creditors that priority required by the Boyd and Los Angeles cases
is open to serious doubt. The commission, in the letter previously
referred to, expressed the opinion that deferment plans were the only
type which a court could approve under Chapter XV, thus implying that
such plans would satisfy the rule of the strict priority cases. 97 This statement was made, it should be noted, prior to the decision in the Los Angeles
case which so vigorously affirms the principles of the Boyd case98
An open question too is whether the cash-reduction-deferment plans
are adequate under the priority rule. If the plans providing no present
payment meet the requirements, those providing for part payment of
principal and deferment of the balance certainly should. As an indication
of how little creditors are really receiving even in these most favorable
plans, however, it is necessary only to compare the orthodox contract
principle under which part payment in cash is no consideration for the
extension of a matured claim.99
If the Supreme Court should decide that neither straight deferment
nor cash-reduction-deferment plans which leave unaltered the interests
of unsecured creditors or stockholders meet the standards of the priority
rule, Chapter XV in its present form would as a practical matter be a
9s Ibid.
96 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 2z, at 83. In the light of this conclusion cf. the plan of the
Chicago, Memphis & Gulf R. Co. outlined in note 72 supra.
97 Ibid.

98 Case et al. v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 6o S. Ct. 1 (1939).

99See i Williston, Contracts § 120 (rev. ed. 1936).
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nullity. The legal and practical limitations would make it virtually impossible to put through any plan under its provisions.
Since, however, in addition to the commission's abstract opinion, a
three-judge court has found that one plan involving principally deferments satisfies the requirements of the Boyd case, 00 we may assume that
until an adverse Supreme Court decision on the subject, deferment plans
will continue to be proposed.
MISCELLAMEOUS PROVISIONS

In addition to the basic provisions of the act heretofore discussed, there
are a number of additional provisions which deserve comment.
The first of these is the provision that "nothing herein contained shall
be construed to authorize the court to appoint any trustee or receiver for
said properties or any part thereof, or otherwise take possession of such
' x
properties or control the operation or administration thereof. 'b0
This provision is in direct contrast with the recent trend in reorganization legislation toward strengthening the jurisdiction of the court and requiring
competent and disinterested trustees. 0 2 If no trustee is appointed there
necessarily will be no investigation into the past acts of the management
which in some instances may be directly responsible for the insolvent
condition of the corporation. Prohibition of the court's appointing a
trustee or taking any control of or administering the property strengthens
the conclusion that the court's function is intended to be limited to approving the management plan as presented.
Another indication of the non-stop character of the Chapter XV proceeding is that it apparently contemplates no organization of affected
security holders into independent committees. This conclusion is apparent first, because in sharp contrast to other recent reorganization
legislation,03 no provisions with respect to such committees are included,
and second, because the provision controlling the payment of fees relates
only to "amounts or consideration, directly or indirectly paid or to be
ooIn re B & 0. R. Co., 29 F. Supp. 6o8 (Md. T939), cert. den. by the Supreme Court
January 29, 294o. The petitioner's brief surprisingly did not question the fairness of the
B. & 0. plan, however, so the denial of the petition casts little light on what constitutes
a "fair" Chapter XV plan.
zox

§ 715.

Cf. § 77 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act, ii U.S.C.A. § 205 (C) (1937) which requires the
appointment of a trustee, and §§ 111-21, I56-8 of Chapter X, ii U.S.C.A. §§ 511-21, 556-8
(Supp. 1938) requiring the appointment of one or more disinterested trustees in all corporate
reorganizations involving liabilities in excess of $250,000.
103 Cf. §§ 209-13 of Chapter X, 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 609-13 (Supp. 1938).
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paid by or for the petitionerfor expenses, etc. ' 104 If there is no possibility
of compensation there will, as a practical matter, be no effective independent committees. While the history of protective committees has
been unfortunate in many respects, 05 the solution of that problem is not
their abolition but rather better regulation of their activities, °S for it is
certainly not desirable that the management monopolize security representation in reorganization proceedings.

A provision important to the carrying out of the fait accompliprocedure
is that requiring the railroad during the proceedings before the court to
make the reduced interest payments contemplated by the plan. x07 From
the point of view of the creditor whose acceptance of the plan is solicited,
the plan may as well be consummated so far as the interest he receives is
concerned. Further, he is told that in all likelihood, unless he accepts the
plan, he may receive no payments for a considerable length of time. So
he accepts and thereby facilitates the fait accompli.
CONCLUSIONS

Now, granting that the conclusions heretofore reached are correct and
that Chapter XV plans by and large will be moratoria plans over which
neither the Interstate Commerce Commission nor the court will have any
effective jurisdiction, it may be asked what harm other perhaps than that
resulting from inequities in the degrees of deferment as between various
classes of creditors, can result from plans which do not permanently reduce creditors' claims in any way. It is obvious that the answer to this
question will vary between different railroads. The present condition and
future prospects of the roads vary widely. It will be impracticable at
this time to attempt any individual analysis of the possible application
of Chapter XV to any one railroad. It is practicable, however, to examine briefly the position of the railroad industry as a whole and its
probable future.
Implicit in the desirability of a moratorium statute is the assumption
that the obligation due is not an overburdening one and that the inability
to meet it is the result of an extraordinary business situation. Moratoria
(6) (italics added).
Securities and Exchange Commission Reports on the Study and Investigation of
the Work, Activities, Personnel, and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees,
especially pts. I and II (1936-8).
1°6 This is the conclusion reached by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Pt. II ibid.,
"X4§ 725

105 See

at 528 et seq.) and is reflected in the provisions of Chapter X (§§ 209-13, ii U.S.C.A. §§ 6o9-1
(Supp. 1938)) relating to such committees.
1o7§ 728.
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legislation is justifiable only if the payments extended could reasonably be
made under normal conditions.
What, then, is the present condition of the railroads and what are their
future prospects? In April of this year, 1o9 roads operating almost 78,000
miles, representing nearly one-third of the country's mileage and having
outstanding almost the same percentage of the unmatured funded railroad debt were in receivership or reorganization."' 8 Another third of the
roads are marginal producers in such weakened condition that they continually have difficulty meeting their fixed charges and probably could
not survive prolonged depression conditionsY'°9 The remaining third of the
roads are in reasonably strong financial condition.
Since under the act, carriers nqw in the custody of the courts or which
have been in receivership or Section 77 proceedings within the past ten
years are prohibited from proposing plans,""O Chapter XV will be applicable principally to the marginal companies comprising the middle
third of the roads.
Many of these roads, in an effort to cut transportation expenses, have
reduced operating staffs to a minimum and have deferred maintenance
to a maximum. In February, 1938, only about half as many persons
were on the railroad pay rolls as there were in 1923-5. The so-called

"Committee of Three" Interstate Commerce Commissioners estimated in
the spring of 1938 that, on a volume of traffic comparable to that of 1937,
the railroads had deferred maintenance of not less than a half billion dollars.-' In addition much of the equipment is old, e.g. 74.1 per cent of all
freight locomotives in use as of December 31, 1937, were at least seventeen

years old." 2 The replacement of old rail and equipment would make for
reduced operating costs and increased efficiency.
This, then, is the present condition of the borderline carriers. The roads
comprising this group, which include approximately twenty-one carriers,
have been unable in almost half the years from 1930-7 to meet their fixed
charges and of the least successful ten, an average of less than four each
year have met these charges. Even in 1937, the best railroad year since
1930, only three of the ten earned fixed charges and the most successful
of the three did so by only i.ii per cent." .3 As one railroad observer has
1o8

See Clay, op. cit. supra note 3,at 4; Moody's Manual, op. cit. supra note 71, at a3.

lo9Ibid.

"° § 710.

- H. Doc. 583, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., at 28 (1938).
112
Clay, op. cit. supra note 3,at S.
"13 See

The Rehabilitation of Railroad Credit, Railway Business Ass'n Series 1939, No. 7,

at 27 (Table No. 4).
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well said, "The railroads not only need more business-they need relief
from archaic capital structures.""r4 The recent history of the intermediate
group for whose use, according to its sponsors Chapter XV was intended,"Is
is not encouraging. What is likely to be the future of this group if no
permanent reductions in funded debt or fixed charges are made but present
maturities are merely deferred?
The earnings prospects of the marginal carriers, in the absence of unique
considerations applicable to individual roads, can be no better than those
of the industry as a whole" 6 and those of the industry as a whole do not
appear very bright. The revenue trends of the entire industry since i899
are revealing. They show that from 1899 through 192o railroad tonnage
and revenues advanced at a faster rate than business activity generally."17
While total tonnage continued to grow larger from 1920 to 1929, it did so
at a lower rate than that of general business expansion. The railroads
were not holding their own though the generally prosperous business
conditions existing from 1923-9 served to obscure this fact." 8
This decline of railroad tonnage and revenue in relation to industrial
production has continued to the present time. In 1937, the best railroad
year since i93o ,though the Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial
Production averaged iio as against iii for 1928, railroad freight tonnage

was 21.1 per cent and freight revenue 28.2 per cent below 1928. Total
revenues, incidentally, were 31.9 per cent below 1928."9
While an improvement in business conditions generally will, of course,
be reflected in improved railroad operations it is doubtful whether the
relative position of the railroads will improve. Unless the use of trucks,
buses, motor cars, airplanes, pipe-lines, inland water carriers and high
tension transmission lines decreases, though all indications are the other
way, railroad passenger and freight traffic will continue for some time to
'14Clay, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5.
ITSee Hearings, op. cit. supra note

21,

at

23.

"1 As a matter of fact, since the fixed charges per dollar of revenue of these carriers average
from 14% to 31% more than those of the financially strong carriers, the prospects of the
marginal carriers may possibly be worse than those of the industry as a whole. See op. cit.
supra note 113, at 6 (Table I).
-7?In x899, railroads as a whole originated x3.4 tons of freight and had revenues of $24.40
per unit of industrial production. By 1920 these figures had increased to i6.5 tons and $53.45
respectively, the greater rise in revenues being due to sharply higher freight rates. See Moody's
Manual, op. cit. supra note 7z, at a3.
I sFor a more detailed discussion of these trends see Moody's Manual, op. cit. supra note 71,

at a3 et seq.
119 Moody's Manual, op. cit. supra note 71, at a4. There are also listed onp. a4 nine of the
principal reasons for the relative decline of the railroads.
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decline in relation to business activity generally. A declining industry is
not likely to benefit by a moratorium. Until the railroads reach a more
stable level of operations, it is desirable that their fixed charges be reduced as much as possible. While the intermediate group of roads are not
over-capitalized if we look only to the cost or reproduction value of their
property, it is quite apparent that looking at the earning capacity of these
roads, they are over-capitalized.20
Deferment of charges of these roads is no real favor to their creditors,
for, as has been previously pointed out, they operate less efficiently and
earn less per dollar of revenue. Much of this operating inefficiency is the
result of insufficient or inadequate equipment, old light rail, winding
road-beds, and manifold grade crossings, all of which slow down traffic
and require excessive maintenance. Still another cause of inefficient
operation is antiquated shop facilities. All these are drains on revenues
which the straitened financial conditions of many of the roads makes it
difficult to overcome. Further, the constant contest to meet over-burdening charges tends always to induce deferment of desirable maintenance
with resulting depreciation of the property. These considerations, coupled
with the declining condition of the industry generally, make it unlikely
indeed that any of the marginal carriers will find deferments of principal
and interest maturities without permanent reductions therein of any
real benefit.
Because there may be a few carriers who will be able to effect necessary
reductions without the lengthy proceedings now characteristic of Section
77 reorganizations or equity receiverships, it may be desirable to provide
some machinery for carrying out such plans. For reasons discussed earlier,
the number of these roads will be small, so small in fact that it is open to
question whether any real need for such machinery exists. If such a
method is to be provided, however, certain important safe-guards not
present in Chapter XV must also be provided. First, the procedure
should be removed from under the influences attendant upon a fail
accompli. One necessary step in this direction would be to require commission and court consideration of the plan before any solicitation of
assents thereto.
Further, no plan should be acceptable which does not provide for
substantial reductions of both principal and interest maturities. In addition, the commission, as well as the court, should be required to pass on
the fairness of the plan. While other desirable provisions will be apparent
120

See Clay, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42 et seq.; note ii

3

supra.
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from the observations heretofore made concerning other provisions of
Chapter XV, these are essential.
In reflecting upon these necessary and desirable provisions, one is
struck by the fact that all but one are now included in Section 77-1 and
that with comparatively moderate amendment that section might be
made to serve most admirably.
Whatever the form of the alteration, however, Chapter XV in its present form should not be continued, for, rather than assisting the borderline carriers and the railroads generally, it will result in the accumulation
of an insurmountable debt burden which will make the ultimate read-

justment the more painful.- A marginal operator in a declining industry
is best served, not by deferment of fixed charges and principal maturities,
but by their reduction or elimination.
2

§ 77 does not now require that a plan provide for a reduction of fixed charges and

maturities.

- In the words of Chairman Eastman of the ICC: "such a plan only defers the evil day
and makes it worse when it finally arrives." Hearings, op. cit. supra note 21, at 83.

